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HOLINESS OF HEART AND LIFE: 
LESSONS FROM NORTH AMERICAN METHODISM1
Randy L. Maddox
Near the end of his life, John Wesley proposed that propagation of the message of entire
sanctification was the chief reason why God had raised up his Methodist movement.2 Whatever
one makes of this claim to providential purpose, the doctrine of Christian Perfection clearly
became the focus of Methodism’s most vigorous early debates, both with opponents and within
the movement. Nowhere were the internal debates more polarized than among North American
Methodists. Partisan factions emerged in the early nineteenth century, dividing on a spectrum
that ran from denial of any need for or possibility of entire sanctification to insistence that it was
a state of Christian victory that could be entered instantaneously by any believer (however young
in their Christian life) who simply claimed it in faith.
There have been several attempts to account for this divergence among Wesley’s
American descendants. Some have ascribed it primarily to the impact of incompatible temporal
variations in Wesley’s views on entire sanctification that are reflected in the materials he
bequeathed to his movement.3 Others (who often assume more consistency to Wesley’s own
understanding) highlight tensions between his teachings on Christian Perfection and those of
some of his coworkers and early followers.4 The question that either of these suggestions leaves
is how the character and dynamics of the early Methodist experience in North America may have
itself contributed to divergence over the issue of entire sanctification. In one of the first con-
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siderations of this question, John Peters attributed deviation from Wesley’s understanding to a
(claimed) omission of his Plain Account of Christian Perfection from American Methodist
publication and influence in the crucial years of 1812–32.5 A more widely held suggestion is that
the Enlightenment optimism and stress on individual human liberty that permeated culture in the
new United States of America made it increasingly difficult to maintain the traditional Protestant
assumption of original sin—the eradication of which was (supposedly) Wesley’s defining
purpose for entire sanctification.6 In some contrast, the other major proposal is that the alien
influence of subtly Reformed models of divine/human interaction in sanctification heightened
the tendency of the “holiness” wing of American Methodism to equate Christian Perfection with
the event of the “baptism of Holy Spirit,” thereby accenting its instantaneous character at the
expense of growth—in significant contrast from Wesley.7
While there is much that is helpful in these various suggestions, I have become convinced
that there was another significant factor involved that has not received due attention. Put briefly,
early American Methodists decisively (though, initially, without recognizing it!) abandoned
Wesley’s basic understanding of how humans make moral choices and enact them (i.e., his
“moral psychology”) for a very different model. On the terms of this new model, Wesley’s
central emphases concerning sanctification and Christian Perfection no longer made sense or
held together. As a result, his American descendants were left to fight over fragments of their
heritage, or to turn elsewhere for views more congenial to their adopted moral psychology.
To develop this suggestion, I will need to outline Wesley’s assumptions about moral
psychology and their connection to his understanding of sanctification. I will then turn attention
to the abandonment of this moral psychology in American Methodism. Finally, I will suggest
how this change helps account for the debates over entire sanctification among Wesley’s
American descendants. I believe this process will put us in an enlightening position to reflect on
what lessons we might learn from this American Methodist saga about the dynamics of spiritual
growth and the possibility of Christian Perfection.
I. WESLEY’S “AFFECTIONAL” MODEL OF CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
Let me begin with some observations about Wesley’s eighteenth-century British context.8
Early Anglican moral thought was dominated by an “intellectualist” model, where virtue was a
matter of reason suppressing the distractions of the (irrational) passions to enable morally free
and correct acts of will. This reigning model was aggressively challenged in the eighteenth
century by the empiricist turn in English philosophy. For empiricism truth is something
experienced receptively by the human intellect, not imposed by it, or simply preexistent within
it. In relation to moral psychology, this philosophical conviction led to the insistence that the
human will can likewise be moved to action only by being experientially affected. While
intellectual assessment of the conditions and consequences of a proposed course of action may
take place, personal action will ensue only if the “affections” are also engaged, inclining the
person toward the action.
This emphasis on the indispensable contribution of the affections to human action was
not limited to philosophers in eighteenth-century England. It found strong advocates as well
among theologians seeking to counteract the emerging deistic reductions
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of religion to mere reverence for the truths of natural revelation and reason. One of the strongest
voices arguing that reason alone was not sufficient to motivate or enable spiritual life was Isaac
Watts. Wesley agreed strongly enough with Watts’ argument in this regard to abridge it and
republish it for his Methodist people.9
When Wesley’s endorsement of Watts is combined with his lifelong commitment to an
empiricist epistemology, the natural expectation is that he would have been dissatisfied with an
intellectualist moral psychology, preferring the model which had a deep appreciation for the
contribution of the affections to human action. Such a preference is easy to demonstrate.10 More
to the point, this preference was not simply a tangential concern for Wesley. It found central
expression in his understanding of human nature, the human problem, and the Way of
Salvation.11
Consider first his understanding of human nature. Wesley’s typical list of faculties that
constitute the Image of God in humanity included the understanding, the will, liberty, and
conscience. In evaluating this list one must recognize that Wesley was not using “will” to
designate a human faculty of rational self-determination, as is typical in current usage; rather, he
specifically equated the will with the affections. And how did he conceive these affections? To
begin with, they are not simply “feelings,” they are the indispensable motivating inclinations
behind all human action. On the other hand, they are neither mere intellectual assent nor blind
attraction; rather, in their ideal expression, the affections integrate the rational and emotional
dimensions of human life into a holistic inclination toward particular choices or acts. Finally,
while provocative of human action, the affections have a crucial receptive dimension as well.
They are not self-causative, but are awakened and thrive in response to experience of external
reality. In what Wesley held forth as the crucial instance, it is only in response to our experience
of God’s gracious love for us, shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit, that the human
affection of love for God and others is awakened and grows.12
While the affections are responsive, they need not be simply transitory. Wesley was clear
that they can be habituated into enduring dispositions. Drawing on a characteristic eighteenth-
century use of the term, he called such habituated dispositions “tempers.” The major positive
example of such a temper (or habituated affection) for Wesley was precisely love of God and
neighbor. Indeed, he summarized holiness itself in terms of this temper. As he once put it, “From
the true love of God and [other humans] directly flows every Christian grace, every holy and
happy temper. And from these springs uniform holiness of conversation.”13 
Wesley’s language of holy actions flowing from holy tempers suggests that he
appreciated the sense in which habituated affections bring “freedom” for human actions—the
freedom that comes from disciplined practice (e.g., the freedom to play a Bach concerto).14 Yet,
he was also aware that some contemporary thinkers (e.g., Hume) were presenting the influence
of our affections on our actions as invincible, thereby undermining human freedom. To avoid
such implications Wesley carefully distinguished “liberty” from will. He understood liberty as
our capacity to enact (or refuse to enact!) our desires and inclinations. This capacity is what
allowed Wesley to appreciate the contributions of habit, education, and argument to human
willing, without rendering such willing totally determined.
It is because our actions are not totally determined that Wesley took the issues of 
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human sin and salvation so seriously. The role of the affections was central to his understanding
of both of these topics. In the case of sin, Wesley insisted that the issue was more than individual
wrong actions. He frequently discussed sin in terms of a threefold division: sinful nature or
tempers, sinful words, and sinful actions. The point of this division was that our sinful actions
and words flow from corrupted tempers, so the problem of sin must ultimately be addressed at
this affectional level. This point is also reflected in the way that the mature Wesley shifted his
discussion of the classic Western doctrine of Original Sin away from questions of inherited guilt,
focusing instead on the present disordering impact of Inbeing Sin.15 While some have
occasionally accused Wesley of viewing this Inbeing Sin as a foreign substance or entity that
causes sinful actions, it was really more relational in character. The most basic cause of our
present infirmity for Wesley was not some “thing” that we inherit, but the distortion of our
nature resulting from being born into this world already separated from the empowering Divine
Presence. Deprived of the affect of this essential relationship, our various faculties inevitably
become debilitated, leaving us morally depraved. For one particular, our weakened affections
take on unholy tempers.
As a corollary of his understanding of our human problem, Wesley’s chief complaint
against the models of Christian salvation which he discerned among his fellow Anglican clergy
was that they restricted themselves to outward matters, neglecting the affectional dimension of
human life. His own typical definition of Christian life placed primary emphasis on renewing
this inward dimension, described in such terms as: “the life of God in the [human] soul; a
participation of the divine nature; the mind that was in Christ; or, the renewal of our heart after
the image of [God who] created us.”16 Involved here would be both an awakening of the
affections in response to the affect of God’s gracious empowering Presence, and a shaping of
those affections into holy dispositions (tempers). Since holiness of thought, word, and action
would flow from such renewal, Wesley once identified the essential goal of all true religion as
the recovery of holy tempers.17
 But how does this recovery take place? How are our sin-debilitated affections re-
empowered and the sinful distortions of their patterning influence reshaped? Wesley was quite
clear that we cannot accomplish this through our human efforts alone. Its possibility lies instead
in the regenerating impact of God’s graciously restored pardoning Presence in the lives of
believers. Yet God’s grace does not infuse holy tempers instantaneously complete. Rather, God
awakens in believers the “seed” of every virtue.18 These seeds then strengthen and take shape as
we responsively “grow in grace.”
It is crucial to note that Wesley assumed this growth would be a “co-operant” affair,
because it is grounded in God’s responsible grace, which both enables our ability to respond and
respects our integrity in that response. This assumption is central to Wesley’s recommended set
of “means of grace.” He valued the means of grace both as avenues by which God conveys the
gracious Presence that enables our responsive growth in holiness and as “exercises” by which we
responsibly nurture that holiness. Since holiness is rooted in the affections, he also highlighted
the way in which various means of grace serve to enliven our affectional motivation and/or to
shape our affectional disposition. Indeed, Wesley’s developed set of recommended means of
grace manifests a conscious concern to balance these two effects.19
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This leaves only the question of how far the recovery of holy tempers can be realized in
this life. Probably Wesley’s most well-known claim is that entire sanctification is a present
possibility for Christians. What exactly did he mean by this? Perhaps the best place to start an
explanation is to make clear that entire sanctification (or Christian Perfection) is not an isolated
reality, but a dynamic level of maturity within the larger process of sanctification, the level
characteristic of “adult” Christian life. We noted above that Wesley considered love to be the
essence of Christian life. Thus, when he wanted to be more specific, he would define Christian
Perfection as “the humble, gentle, patient love of God, and our neighbor, ruling our tempers,
words, and actions.”20 It is important to notice that love is not only said to be present, it is ruling.
God’s love is shed abroad in the lives of all Christians, awakening their responsive love for God
and others. But this love is weak, sporadic, and offset by contrary affections in new believers. In
the lives of the entirely sanctified Wesley maintained that it rules “to the point that there is no
mixture of any contrary affections—all is peace and harmony.”21
Affections contrary to love would be “inward sin.” Wesley believed that this inward sin
was overcome in entire sanctification. In a few instances he described this overcoming as a
“rooting out” or “destruction” of inward sin. As he came to realize, this language is problematic,
because talk of the destruction of sinful affections can connote the impossibility of their return.
By contrast, Wesley became convinced of the sad reality that sinful affections (and resulting
outward sins) may reemerge in lives that had been ruled by love. How could one express the
benefits of Christian Perfection without obscuring this fact? When Wesley was pressed directly
on this point he offered the alternative account that in the soul of an entirely sanctified person
holy tempers are presently reigning to the point of “driving out” opposing tempers (although
these may return).22
At this juncture, I must reemphasize that Wesley’s focus on affections in describing
Christian Perfection was not intended as an alternative to actions. He understood that acts of love
flow from a temper of love. Yet, he also recognized that ignorance, mistakes, and other human
frailties often distort the passage from affection to action. It was in this sense 
that he tired of the debate over whether Christian Perfection was “sinless.” He did indeed believe
that it consisted in holy tempers, but not that it was characterized by infallible expression of
those tempers in actions.
Perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s affectional view of entire sanctification, then,
is to say that he was convinced that the Christian life did not have to remain a life of perpetual
struggle. He believed that both Scripture and Christian tradition attested that God’s loving grace
can transform sinful human lives to the point where our own love for God and others becomes a
free response. Christians can aspire to take on the disposition of Christ, and live out that
disposition within the constraints of our human infirmities.23 To deny this possibility would be to
deny the sufficiency of God’s empowering grace—to make the power of sin greater than that of
grace.
II. EARLY AMERICAN REJECTION OF WESLEY’S MORAL PSYCHOLOGY
If the preceding discussion has been successful in establishing a connection between
Wesley’s moral psychology and his characteristic emphases concerning entire sanctification, it
will provide good perspective for considering any divergence of early American 
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Methodists from Wesley. One clear divergence is the broad rejection of Wesley’s moral
psychology among his American descendants. It would be helpful to place this rejection in
historical context.
During the latter half of the eighteenth century the empiricist emphasis on the role of the
affections in human willing found some extreme formulations in British philosophy. The most
notorious example was David Hume, who essentially reduced all human sense of moral
obligation and inclination to functions of the physical passions. The deterministic implications of
Hume’s position called forth strong reactions—most notably, that of Thomas Reid. In an attempt
to rebut Hume, Reid championed an account of duty and obligation that returned to an
intellectualist moral psychology, with emphasis on rational control of the passions or
affections.24 Central to his argument was the insistence that the psychological faculty of the will
should not be identified with the affections, but was instead our free rational ability to choose
between (or suppress) the various stimuli that motivate action. In this distinction, Reid removed
rational intentionality from the affections, implying that they were actually irrational. Moreover,
his maxim that only intentional acts have moral status led him to depict habituated tendencies
(tempers) as strictly amoral—if not indeed opposed to truly moral acts—since they operate with
minimal conscious intentionality.
The importance of Reid to our topic is the consistency with which his basic position was
adopted in North American circles to critique theological expressions of a deterministic
affectional moral psychology. The leading target for such criticism was, of course, Jonathan
Edwards. An affectional moral psychology was central to Edwards’ Treatise Concerning
Religious Affections (1746). His major purpose in this treatise was to defend the role of appeals
to the affections in current revival efforts by arguing that the affections were integral to Christian
life—as the “springs” from which holy actions flow.25 It should not be surprising that John
Wesley found this basic affectional psychology congenial enough to republish an abridged
edition of Edwards’ treatise for his Methodist people.26 This congeniality was heightened by the
fact that the edition of this treatise that Wesley read and republished omitted the passages in
Edwards’ original edition that most explicitly characterized the holy affections as an “infused
habitus,” i.e., a gift from God that unilaterally represses evil affections and effects holy acts.27
Edwards’ background conviction hinted at in these omitted passages became central to his later
essay on Freedom of the Will, where he argued that the will is not itself a real entity, but simply
an expression of the strongest motive (affection) in a person’s character. Thus a sinful human
nature cannot desire to please God unless God—by a miraculous infusion of created grace (i.e.,
holy affections)—changes the sinner’s character.28 Edwards develops this point in extended
contrast with Arminianism, arguing that the Arminian stress on human liberty results in a
psychology that cannot explain why we would ever make choices, and a moral philosophy that
does not value virtuous habits and inclinations. In his posthumously published thoughts
“Concerning Efficacious Grace” Edwards gave this the sharpest edge, repeatedly rejecting the
(Wesleyan!) use of Philippians 2: 12–13 to teach co-operant grace.29 In a concern to argue that
God was solely responsible for our holiness and salvation, Edwards had to reject any notion that
virtues are “habits” that are developed in a gradual and insensible way. He was not even content
to say the Spirit infuses the potential for virtuous habits; 
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rather God infuses the fully-formed holy habits or disposition of the heart immediately. As a
result, the change from being a vicious person to having a virtuous character is instantaneous.
Such a strong model of Divine grace operating unilaterally through the human will
inevitably gave rise to debate, even within New England Calvinism.30 In their attempt to develop
a more compatibilist model of Divine grace and human action, revisionary (or “New Divinity”)
Calvinists typically turned from Edwards to the intellectualist moral psychology of Thomas Reid
and his disciples.31 The theological voices among early American Methodists were drawn into
this intra-Calvinist debate. They found themselves in an awkward position. On the one hand,
they criticized the New Divinity theologians as being inconsistent with their Reformed tradition.
On the other hand, they insisted that both the New Divinity model and Edwards’ model resulted
in a determinism that undermined the moral integrity and love of God.32 Throughout, their
theological concern was focused much more on how to avoid any infringements on human
freedom in the emotional/intellectual dynamics of spiritual life than on Wesley’s focal issue of
how to awaken affectional commitment in persons who were already conventional (i.e., merely
intellectual) Christians.
The crucial thing to note, for our purposes, is that these American Methodist theologians
also appropriated Reid’s intellectualist psychology to articulate their alternative model of the
dynamics of spiritual life.33 This move took nearly “official” status with the publication of
excerpts from two prominent expositors of Reid’s moral psychology in the first volume of the
Methodist Review (1818), and the release of an American edition of Reid’s Works from the
Methodist publishers in 1822.34 
There is no better indicator of the extent of this appropriation of Reid’s moral psychology
than the consistency with which these early American Methodist theologians distinguished the
affections from the will, and defined the latter as the principle of independent rational choice.35
In place of Wesley’s enumeration of our psychological faculties as understanding, will, liberty,
and conscience, the typical American Methodist list became that of Reid: understanding,
affections (or sensibilities), and will.36 In further consonance with Reid, these American
theologians demonstrated a tendency to portray the affections as inherently irrational, needing
regulation by the more primary human faculty of understanding.37 Likewise, they typically
judged habits and inclinations to have moral status only when voluntarily embraced, and were
prone to evaluate them more as obstacles to—than as facilitators of—free action.38
It must be admitted that these changes from Wesley appear to have taken place with little
initial consciousness of the fact. The first instance that I have found where debate erupted over
how Wesley’s faculty psychology might relate to that assumed in American Methodist dialogue
was in 1842!39 And it was 1888 before there was the clear concession that Wesley identified the
will with the affections, while contemporary American Methodist theologians did not. However,
this was assumed to be only a semantic difference—Kant had taught contemporary theologians
to use “will” to designate what Wesley called “liberty.”40
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CHRISTIAN PERFECTION
In reality, the difference between Wesley and Reid (or Wesley and Kant!) was more 
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than a matter of semantics. It involved alternative emphases concerning the role of the affections
in processes of human choice and action. As such, it was inevitable that the switch in moral
psychology that we have traced in early American Methodism would have effects on their
appropriation of Wesley’s “affectional” understanding of Christian Perfection. It is time to turn
our attention to these effects.
A. Impact Through Mid-Nineteenth Century
The fortunes of Wesley’s understanding of entire sanctification during the initial
generation of American Methodism (1772–1816, the tenure of Francis Asbury’s ministry) can be
summarized in several generalizations. First, even if their preoccupation was with calling sinners
to conversion, the concern for holiness of heart and life pervaded the preaching of the early
Methodist itinerants.41 Second, the status of early Methodism as a counter-cultural movement
within the dominant “culture of honor and deference” in the surrounding society fostered a social
coherence that minimalized doctrinal debate.42 Third, the most defining influence on early
American Methodism was actually Asbury, but his characteristic emphases on sanctification
reflected the “mature” balance of Wesley, valuing preaching the possibility of entire
sanctification as much for how it fosters present growth in holy affections as for any actual
attainment.43 Yet, fourth, Asbury could also affirm proclaiming Christian Perfection because of
the way it distracted the early Methodists from contending for the right of their (unordained)
preachers to serve eucharist!44 In this evaluation one senses that the central role of the means of
grace to Wesley’s understanding of sanctification was beginning to slip among his American
descendants.
The role of the means of grace would be further diminished in the years following
Asbury’s death, as the impact of the switch to an intellectualist moral psychology spread among
American Methodists. This impact might seem hard to discern, since nineteenth-century
American Methodism remained heavily dependent upon British treatments of Christian
Perfection through mid-century.45 However, there was a noticeable increase of influence of
British voices other than Wesley—and in some tension with Wesley—as this period progressed,
an increase that can be correlated with the shifting moral psychology traced above.
The first case to consider is John Fletcher. As one of Wesley’s closest coworkers,
Fletcher imbibed and echoed many of Wesley’s major themes. In particular, he strongly
endorsed the point that the goal of sanctification (Christian Perfection) is not merely a
deliverance from the power of sin, but most properly a recovery of the holy tempers.46 At the
same time, Fletcher was more defined by controversial dialogue with the Calvinists than Wesley.
As a result, in his attempt to counter Edward’s deterministic equation of affections with the will
Fletcher moved toward identifying the will as the power of rational self-determination, and
emphasized that true freedom comes from rationally controlling the affections, appetites, and
passions.47 When this move is combined with Fletcher’s association (in direct contrast to
Wesley) of the entrance into Christian Perfection with the “baptism of the Holy Spirit,” the
framework was laid for a model of entire sanctification focused largely in one volitional event.48
While Fletcher himself continued to affirm the importance of growth throughout the Christian
life, he could also advise believers not to “wait idly” in the means of grace for the perfecting
work of God, but to “take it by force” 
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in prayer.49 This latter advice found a growing audience among American Methodists in the
nineteenth century.50 By mid-century it could vie for authority with Wesley’s own treatments.51
Another British voice that gained an increased hearing by mid-century was Adam
Clarke.52 Clarke’s somewhat ambiguous position further heightened the contrast with Wesley’s
affectional model of sanctification. To begin with, Clarke was even more explicit than Fletcher
in equating the will with liberty.53 At the same time, he described both sin and holiness in nearly
deterministic terms: as long as unholy affections were present in our life we cannot live truly
holy lives; but once God fills us with holy tempers such lives will flow forth naturally. Most
importantly, both the destruction of the unholy tempers and the filling with holy tempers were
presented as God’s unilateral and instantaneous acts (reminiscent of Edwards!). Clarke strongly
rejected any notion of gradual purification from unholy tempers.54 The result was a model of
Christian Perfection as instantaneous purification, with little or no role of “character formation”
in overcoming vice, though it may play some role in developing the implanted seeds of virtue.
The major tendencies we have been noting continued (though with some moderation) in
our other major British voice, Richard Watson. Watson is of particular importance to our story
because his Theological Institutes became the standard text in American Methodist theological
education for the middle five decades of the nineteenth century. As such, it is significant that
Watson clearly turned to an intellectualist moral psychology (apparently drawing on Reid) to
critique Edwards’ model of Christian life.55 Given his dependance upon Wesley, Watson did
keep affection language in his descriptions of sanctification. But, like Clarke, he portrayed the
deliverance from all unholy affections and the introduction of the seeds of holy affections as an
instantaneous event.56 At the same time, Watson stressed more than Clarke the necessary
development of holy habits and virtues that must follow this event, and could talk of the period
between regeneration and entire sanctification as “advancing” toward this event.57 While this
would seem to keep Watson more in line with Wesley’s model of how holy character is
developed, it must be balanced by the recognition that Watson’s intellectualist psychology also
led him to evaluate the means of grace primarily in terms of “duty.” For example, he treats the
sacraments of baptism and Lord’s Supper as signs that confirm (but do not convey!) God’s
grace, and argues in specific relation to prayer that it is not an instrument of grace but a
“condition” of grace.58 As such, his warning about missing the Lord’s Supper habitually is not
that one loses its empowering and formative benefits, but only that it is a violation of Christ’s
plain command.59
To test the extent to which these additional British voices were congruent with (and
influential on) American Methodism in the first half of the nineteenth century, we need only note
characteristic emphases of those American writers who addressed Christian Perfection in this
period. First, the Americans clearly use the intellectualist moral psychology of the will
controlling the affections as the interpretive framework for discussing Christian Perfection.60
Second, there is a growing openness among the American writers to identification of entire
sanctification with the baptism of the Holy Spirit, and portrayal of this event as a time when evil
affections are instantly removed and holy tempers instilled.61 Third, given this more
instantaneous focus, if means of grace are mentioned, it is often only a call to attend preaching
on entire sanctification and to pray earnestly for it.62 Even when 
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the broader set of means of grace are invoked, it is more in terms of duties than as formative
disciplines.63 In light of this reconception, the noticeable decline in the use of means of grace
among Methodists through the nineteenth-century is less surprising.64
As this summary demonstrates, differences were developing in nineteenth-century
American Methodism with central assumptions of Wesley’s understanding of Christian
Perfection. These differences would spark open debates in the second half of the century. I will
consider the debates in the northern and southern churches separately. In each case my main
concern is not to give an exhaustive survey, but to suggest how the change in moral psychology
that we have been tracing contributed to them.65
B. Debates over Christian Perfection in Northern Methodism, 1850–1900
American debate over the authentic “Wesleyan” understanding of entire sanctification
broke out first in the northern church. Importantly, the majority of participants on all sides of this
debate accepted an intellectualist moral psychology as self-evident, differing only on its
implications for Christian Perfection. Such dominance by the intellectualist psychology is not
hard to explain. It continued to be used in influential apologetic responses against the
Calvinists.66 It was the perspective defended in the texts on moral philosophy placed on the
required Course of Study for traveling elders.67 And it remained central to discussions of
anthropology in standard Methodist systematic theologies.68
The first shots in the northern debate actually began their flight from outside. In 1839
Asa Mahan (a Congregationalist) published a defense of Christian Perfection articulated
rigorously within the assumptions of the intellectualist moral psychology of Thomas Reid.69 On
these terms, perfection became the full and perfect voluntary discharge of our rational duty to
God and all other beings! More specifically, it was the ever vigilant use of our will to impose
rational control on our passions, appetites, and propensities, so that our every choice might be
freed for obedience to God’s command.70 When it was protested that such an ideal was
impossible, Mahan responded that it becomes possible when Christians accept (subsequent to
justification) the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, for this baptism strengthens their rational self-
control.71
At first glance the gap between Mahan’s understanding of Christian Perfection and that
of Wesley would seem unbridgeable. Holiness is no longer a matter of the graciously empowered
and guided progressive transformation of our affectional nature into the holistic disposition of
Christ, it is the simple maintenance (with some help by the Holy Spirit) of an ongoing series of
“free” (i.e., regardless of inner inclinations) rational choices to fulfill our duties. The only means
of grace central to the latter model would be ones that are conditions of the Baptism of the Holy
Spirit, or that exhort us regularly concerning our duty—e.g., sermon, Scripture reading, and
prayer.
Despite these differences, Mahan’s model of Christian Perfection proved congenial to
many Methodists.72 Surely its most enthusiastic appropriation was in the writings of Phoebe
Palmer. While Palmer “lowered the standard” of our duty to the single matter of total surrender
or devotion to God, she kept Mahan’s emphasis that such devotion is possible by a perpetual
rational exercise of will.73 The congruence of Palmer’s model of holiness with Reid’s
intellectualist psychology is best evidenced by its appropriation in Thomas Upham, who had
become a leading exponent of this psychology.74
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The strong intellectualism of Upham’s model of Christian Perfection is most clear in his
claim that those entirely sanctified would experience temptation only “theoretically,” not
sensibly. This claim sparked a prolonged rejoinder from Merritt Caldwell, explicitly based on
disagreement over spiritual/moral psychology.75 Caldwell took it as obvious that no Christian
reaches the point of not being occasionally “sensibly” tempted or inclined to sinful acts. But
drawing on the Reidian tradition of moral psychology, he argued that such inclinations, tempers,
passions, or affections are only natural “feelings” and have no moral status. As such, one can
indeed be delivered from all sin and still feel these temptations.
Caldwell’s attempt to correct Upham served to ignite debate over the nature and
possibility of Christian Perfection in the northern church. On one side of this debate were those
who insisted against Caldwell that inward inclinations to sinful acts were indeed of moral
character—they are the “evil constitutional principle” of Original Sin that remains in believers
following justification.76 On this reading, the very purpose of entire sanctification became the
eradication of this constitutional principle. Importantly, those who developed this reading were
heavily influenced by Fletcher and Clarke. As such, they connected entire sanctification to the
dramatic event of the Baptism of the Holy Spirit, and argued that in this event all unholy
inclinations are instantaneously destroyed and (at least the seeds of) holy inclinations instilled.77
Partisans to this position understood themselves to be defending “Wesleyan” holiness.
But while they were indeed defending the possibility of entire sanctification, their dependance
upon an intellectualist moral psychology led them to a very different understanding of its nature
than Wesley.78 This is most evident in their uncomfortableness with any emphasis on the role of
discipline and nurture in “untwisting” our sinful inclinations. They insisted that all such efforts
are fruitless, that the constitutional principle of evil can only be removed unilaterally by God,
and that any role for nurture or growth would only come after this had taken place. On these
terms, Christian Perfection is distinguished sharply from character formation—a distinction they
drew by contrasting “purity” and “maturity” in the Christian life.79 Christian Perfection, for
them, was a state of simple purity entered instantaneously when all evil inclinations are
destroyed. Maturity awaited subsequent growth in the holy virtues. Not only is this quite
different from Wesley’s identification of Christian Perfection with the full “disposition” of
Christ, they typically give little guidance on how subsequent growth in character is nurtured
(often portraying it as inevitable). While they championed the holiness meeting as a means to the
crisis experience of entire sanctification, one finds little emphasis on formative means of grace
or discipline.80 At times it appeared that their interest lay more in determining just which
“imperfections” could remain in a person who was pure. Given their moral psychology,
arguments over this issue focused on actions and frequently degenerated into legalistic moralism.
I hasten to add that those reacting to this overall model of entire sanctification could be
just as moralistic. These reactions were particularly concerned to deny that Christians must await
a second work of grace before they can be expected to live holy lives. As one example put it,
“The Christian may, and is required by God, to be perfect every day of his life in the sense of
keeping the whole moral law as the fruit of his [or her] regeneration.”81 Given the terms in which
the holiness camp had framed the argument, these writers ended up arguing that the liberating
and empowering benefits of sanctification all come in 
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our initial regeneration.82 This allowed (some of) them to emphasize the process of growing in
grace after regeneration, and to highlight the contribution of the means of grace to such growth.
But what was the character of this growth? They insisted against the holiness camp that nothing
in the believer’s “nature” needed fundamental change, in order for free obedience to be possible.
Yet they were also clear that believers struggle to control temptation or inclinations to sinful
acts. Their main concern was to maintain (echoing the argument, and intellectualist psychology,
of Caldwell) that these inclinations should not be seen as having moral status, or subject to
salvific transformation. If Wesley had disagreed on this point, it was because of his inadequate
psychology!83 And if there was any sense in which Christian Perfection is a distinct state in the
process of sanctification, it is only in the heightened ability that practice brings to repress our
lower (affectional) nature and live in unreserved rational consecration to God.84
It is hard to imagine how such strongly contrasting readings could be reconciled, though
there were some valiant efforts to do so.85 I would suggest that the major reason these efforts
failed is that they continued to assume the intellectualist moral psychology.86 It strikes me as no
accident that, operating within this psychology, leading theologians of the nineteenth-century
Methodist Episcopal Church were often reduced to admitting that they simply could not explain
the dynamics of entire sanctification!87 Nor is it surprising that folk who were confident of their
ability to explain these dynamics (in “holiness” terms) increasingly found themselves in new
denominational contexts.
C. Debates over Christian Perfection in Southern Methodism, 1850–1900
Vigorous debate over Christian Perfection in the Methodist Episcopal Church South
came a generation later than in the north, and largely echoed the earlier northern debates. One of
the clear similarities is that it was again fought against the background of an assumed
intellectualist moral psychology. The particular prominence of this psychology in Southern
Methodism can be attributed to one man—Albert Bledsoe. Bledsoe was a convert to Methodism
from Congregationalism, and his conversion had come through a detailed critique of Edwards’
affectional psychology. His standard in this critique was the intellectualist psychology of
Thomas Reid.88 Thus, it is no accident that the same psychology is represented in the moral
philosophy texts on the course of study for the southern church.89
From its beginnings through the mid-1880s, the “holiness” reading we encountered in the
northern church appears to have enjoyed quiet privilege in the Methodist Episcopal Church
South.90 The quiet was shattered when Jeremiah Boland published a feisty critique of this reading
in 1887.91 His points basically repeat those of the northern critics: regeneration brings all the
purification of our nature necessary for enabling growth in holiness; there is no residue of
Original Sin remaining in believers; the inclinations to sin that remain in believers are natural
and have no moral culpability; and Christian Perfection is simply the consistent obedient free
exercise of our wills that comes with maturity. If there is anything new in Boland, it is the clarity
with which he grounds his position in an intellectualist psychology, and criticizes Wesley for the
inadequacy of his alternative psychology (calling it a “blot on our Arminian Methodism!”).92
As one might expect, Boland’s argument called forth a string of defenses of the
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“holiness” claim that Christian Perfection marks the eradication of evil inclinations remaining in
believers—arguing that it was the biblical position, the position confirmed by experience,
Wesley’s position, and the “standard” position of the Methodist Episcopal Church South.93 A
more unique response to Boland was offered by George Hayes, who argued that the debate could
be solved by modifying the claims of both sides. Against Boland, Hayes insisted that an
inherited depravity remains in believers which is not simply “natural”; while against the
eradicationists, he argued that this depravity is not sin in itself and will never be removed in this
life. Holiness then becomes a process (made possible by regeneration and discipline) of
increasing our ability to resist this depravity through strengthening of our character, and
Christian Perfection the mature establishment of that character.94 While this sounds a little closer
to Wesley, it does not take long to see that Hayes views character in intellectual terms, defining
it as “doing the best we know.”95
This is particularly disappointing, because there were at least a few in the southern
church who were uncomfortable with the reigning intellectualist psychology and struggled to
articulate an alternative in connection with the nature of holiness.96 Overall, such voices were
rare. More common were protests about the way that some were reducing holiness to “mere
emotionalism,” protests that often carried themselves the tone of legalistic moralism.97 Against
this background, the truly surprising thing is that southern irenic attempts to mediate between
competing groups were somewhat more successful than in the north.98
D. Twentieth-Century Developments?
The next logical step would be to carry our story on through the twentieth century. But
there is actually very little to tell! To borrow an image that I believe Albert Outler first used,
Christian Perfection, which was a cornerstone of Wesley’s theology, had become by the
twentieth century an annoying pebble in the shoe of American Methodism. While a few sought
to remove it, most studiously ignored it as they limped along. In part this was due to exhaustion
with the infighting that we have been tracing. But it also reflected the fact that none of the
competing sides had been able to articulate a compelling model of the dynamics of sanctification
and the ideal of Christian Perfection.
I have argued that a major obstacle to the nineteenth-century attempts to retrieve
Wesley’s understanding of Christian Perfection was the intellectualist moral psychology that
they all assumed. If this was indeed the case, then we can understand why the notion of Christian
Perfection became even less conceivable or attractive to American Methodists in the twentieth
century. It is true that by the turn of the century the influence of Reid’s philosophical and moral
tradition was fading. But it was widely replaced by neo-Kantian assumptions that were as
intellectualist in their moral psychology as Reid had ever been. If anything, the new trends
heightened the “decisionistic” aspect of this psychology—locating moral value in the
independence of each choice from any personal inclinations or desires. Such neo-Kantian
assumptions were particularly prevalent in Methodist theology, due to the dominance of Boston
Personalism in these circles. A leading theme of this school of thought was the need to
rationalize religion by purifying it of all mystical and ceremonial overlays.99 Thus, it should be
no surprise that they found Wesley’s conception of Christian Perfection difficult to appreciate, or
that they (and most others) offer in its place largely an emphasis on rational control of our
emotions and fulfillment of our duty to God and others.100
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IV. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Such is the American Methodist saga with the notion of Christian Perfection. What
lessons might we learn from the journey? I would suggest that the first lesson is simply to
recognize how integrally connected models of spirituality are to assumptions about moral
psychology. We cannot presume that every model can be convincingly translated into different
sets of assumptions. Likewise, we cannot presume that every set of assumptions about moral
psychology is equally adequate for understanding spiritual life or models of its development.
A second lesson is the insight that this casestudy provides into some of the characteristics
that an intellectualist moral psychology imposes on conceptions of spiritual life. For example,
emotions or affections enter into such a spirituality primarily as adversaries to overcome or
hindrances to be controlled. Likewise, spiritual victory becomes a result either of increased
rational competence cultivated by careful discipline, or of a decisive purgative event. Either
option creates significant tensions concerning divine/human interaction in salvation. On the first
account, divine grace may be affirmed as the source of our power, but the accent is on what we
do with it. On the second account, there is typically the suggestion of a requisite act on our part
before God’s gracious purgative work in our lives, and an emphasis on our obligation to “retain”
the blessing. Thus, both accounts are open to a subtle Pelagianism and to degenerating into
legalistic moralism. This is because neither has a compelling answer to what attracts or inclines
us toward obedient response. 
This leads to my third lesson, which is that a recovered appreciation for the role of habit
and character in action is not necessarily a sufficient response to the limits of the “decisionistic”
model of morality and spirituality prevalent in the Western world. We encountered more than
enough examples to know that an emphasis on character can be constructed within the
constraints of the intellectualist model—conceiving character as the strengthening of a rational
tendency through repetition and modeling. But such a model would still lack an appreciation for
the affective dimension of inclination.101
I am convinced that the fourth lesson the history of American Methodist discussion of
Christian Perfection should teach us is the necessity of recovering a positive appreciation for the
affectional dimension of human life and spirituality. I use the word “affection” here purposefully
in an attempt to retain a connection between two emphases that are sometimes separated in terms
of emotions and passions. Emotions are often construed with primary emphasis on their
motivating role as inclinations to action.102 The defining characteristic of passions, by contrast, is
their receptive nature, responding to external stimuli or agents. While an intellectualist model
would see such receptivity in negative terms as loss of control, it can be seen instead as a
positive trait—allowing the person to be responsively empowered and shaped (for example, by
encounter with God’s gracious Presence).103 On this reading, emotions and passions would be
inherently intertwined, for our motivating inclinations would be grounded in and shaped by
responsive interaction with God and others.
This leads me to a final lesson: an increased appreciation for the affectional dimension of
spiritual life is necessarily connected to a recognition of the contribution of the full range of the
means of grace in empowering and shaping our affections. This connection was
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sufficiently demonstrated (in reverse) in the history of American Methodism; as an intellectualist
model of spirituality took over, Wesley’s recommended pattern of means of grace was
progressively trimmed down to those that address folk intellectually—e.g., Word, sermon, and
prayer.
All of this leads me to say that American Methodists will only begin to understand anew
what Wesley meant by Christian Perfection as they sense the limitations of the intellectualist
models of human action that surround them and recover Wesley’s appreciation for the affections
and the means of grace. If this ever happens, then they will find that Wesley meant something
very much like Benedict, in his description of a monk who has ascended the steps of discipline in
humility: 
The monk will quickly arrive at that perfect love of God which casts out fear.
Through this love, all that he once performed with dread, he will now begin to
observe without effort, as though naturally, from habit, no longer out of fear of
hell, but out of love for Christ, good habit and delight in virtue. All this the Lord
will by the Holy Spirit graciously manifest in his workman now cleansed of vices
and sins.104
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